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GATT-OUT OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
FOREIGN COPYRIGHT RESTORATION*
The United States has elected to heal the wounds in the inter-
national intellectual property community.' Due to stringent
American copyright rules that were not in conformity with inter-
national norms, the United States has allowed reinstatement to
foreign citizens certain copyrights that have fallen into the public
domain.2 Effective January 1, 1996, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 104A
(1994) ("§ 104A"), the United States Copyright Office began the
process of restoring these copyrights. 3 To be eligible for restora-
tion, a copyright must not be in the public domain in its country of
origin through expiration of its term of protection.4 Furthermore,
* First Prize - 1996 A.S.C.A.P. Nathan Burkan Writing Competition at St. John's
University School of Law; submitted to 1996 National A.S.C.A.P. Nathan Burkan Writing
Competition.
1 See John G. Byrne, Changes on the Frontier of Intellectual Property Law: An Overview
of the Changes Required by GATT, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 121, 128 (1995) (discussing how TRIPS
agreement achieved many of United States' intellectual property objectives including its
desire to bolster international intellectual property); see also Stephen E. Bondura & Lloyd
G. Farr, Intellectual Property Rights Abroad and at Home After GATT, S.C. LAw., Oct. 7,
1995, at 20, 23 (discussing Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") provi-
sions of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT') and noting that, if enforceable,
it will provide U.S. companies with "level playing field" in efforts to protect intellectual
property abroad).
2 See General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs: Intellectual Property Provisions, Joint
Hearings on H.R. 4894 and S. 2368 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judi-
cial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (Serial No. 90) and the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Serial No. J-
103-77), 103 Cong., 2d Sess. '(1994) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (testimony of Eugene
Volokh) (finding that "[t]he two bills ... address a serious problem: Many authors, espe-
cially foreign authors, have lost their copyrights in their works because of certain provi-
sions of pre-1989 U.S. copyright law."); David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L.
REv. 1385, 1402 (1995) (noting that "we [the United States] are now making amends" by
restoring foreign copyrights); Lionel S. Sobel, Back from the Public Domain, 17 ENT. L.
REP. 3, at *1, available in LEXIS, LawRev Library, ALLREV file (discussing trade negotia-
tions in relation to TRIPS and noting that other countries insistence on restoration of cer-
tain of their copyrights by U.S. caused U.S. to agree in order to secure other concessions in
return).
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1995) [hereinafter § 104A] (providing that restored copyright
owner's copyright vests automatically on effective date of restoration); Presidential Procla-
mation No. 6780, 60 Fed. Reg. 15845 (1995) (announcing that effective date of TRIPS is
January 1, 1996); Copyright Office Notice of Policy Decision, 60 Fed. Reg. 7793 (1995) (im-
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the copyright must have been categorized as having fallen into the
public domain in the United States for "noncompliance with for-
malities imposed at any time ... including failure of renewal, lack
of proper notice, or failure to comply with any manufacturing
requirements."5
Whatever the motivation for doing so, a Congressional act that
restores previously dead copyrights is likely to be viewed as a de-
parture from long-standing reticence to decrease the pool of read-
ily available knowledge for the creation of new works.6 The resto-
ration is, in theory, a paradox that grinds against the American
concept of what is encompassed by the public domain.7
Under the common law, a copyright in an unpublished work
lasted in perpetuity until publication of the work in question.,
The common law copyright, however, has been preempted by fed-
eral law.9 It is settled that under federal law, a copyright granted
in perpetuity is unconstitutional because the Copyright Clause
only allows Congress to grant such protection for "limited
5 § 104A(h)(6)(C)(i).
6 See H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 51 (1988). This House Report detailed
amendments to the Copyright Act as a result of the U.S. joining the Berne Convention on
Copyrights. Id. In particular, the restoration of copyrights was discussed. Id. It was noted
that an overbroad grant of retroactive copyrights out of the public domain may have a
stifling effect on the creation of new works. Id. It was stressed that a balancing of interests
between authors control over their works and keeping public domain material freely avail-
able was a pivotal consideration when considering the public domain's role. Id.; David Nim-
mer, Second Wind: Congress Has Restored Copyright Protection to Works Previously in the
Public Domain - and Now the Problems Begin, LA. LAw. 28, 28 (1995) [hereinafter Second
Wind] (discussing effect of § 104A on public domain and noting that public domain no
longer marks boundary from which no copyright will ever return); see also Joint Hearings,
supra note 2, at 190 (testimony of Professor Shira Perlmutter) (asking whether Congress
has authority to remove works from public domain and "fence them off" as private property
and remarking that public domain material is free for anyone to use).
7 BLACics LAw DICTIONARY 1229 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "public domain," as it relates to
copyright law, as "[plublic ownership status of writings, documents or publications that are
not protected by copyrights."); see Nimmer, Second Wind, supra note 6, at 28 (noting that
copyright restoration has "revolutionized the notion of the public domain," and therefore
has "catapulted" durationally eligible foreign works from public ownership status back into
private foreign hands).
8 See Classic Film Museum, Inc. v. Warner Bros., Inc., 453 F. Supp. 852, 855 n.1 (D. Me.
1978) (holding that common law copyright arises on creation of original literary work and
protects author's interest until copyright proprietor publishes work and common law copy-
right expires), affd, 597 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1979).
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1995). Today, although copyright registration is not a condition
of copyright protection, the copyright proprietor of an unpublished work may register his
work with the Copyright Office. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 409 (1995). The application will
indicate that it is unpublished and since copyright registration is a prerequisite for certain
remedies such as attorney's fees, the proprietor has an incentive to register his unpub-
lished work. Id.
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times."10 The actual term length, however, is within Congress' dis-
cretion to decide." Nevertheless, before Congress passed § 104A,
it was a common assumption that once a work had fallen into the
public domain, for whatever reason, it was never going to be under
copyright protection again. 2
Historically, Congress has attempted only once to restore copy-
rights previously in the public domain only once.'" That special
1o U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (copyright protection may be granted "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors
their respective Writings and Discoveries"); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 154 n.4 (1975) (discussing Constitution's "limited times" provision); Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) (noting that at time of decision constitutional limited
times was restriction on Congress and not on state action); Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d
204, 206 (9th Cir. 1938) (holding that provision of 1909 Copyright Act which contained no
time limit on copyrights granted therein was governed by twenty-eight year time limit
found elsewhere in Act and thus copyrights granted under that provision were not uncon-
stitutionally perpetual).
11 Cf Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (discussing Con-
gress' powers to implement patent clause and noting that "[w]ithin the limits of the consti-
tutional grant, the Congress may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers
by selecting the policy which in its judgement best effectuates the constitutional aim");
Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 11, 16 (1829) (contemplating that Constitu-
tion delegates patent term limits to Congress). But see Act of December 18, 1919, 41 Stat.
368, 368-69 (authorizing President to extend time for copyright registration and renewal);
Act of September 25, 1941 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1947)) (authorizing President to ex-
tend time for registration under Copyright Act of 1809); Bong v. Alfred S. Campbell Art Co.,
214 U.S. 236, 243 (1909) (noting that President can also extend work's copyright term
through Presidential Proclamation if Congress has granted permission); Chappell & Co. v.
Fields, 210 F. 864, 867 (2d Cir. 1914) (holding that under 1909 Copyright Act, Presidential
Proclamation is conclusive evidence of necessary basis of its own issuance and thus may
not be judicially reviewed); Time Books v. Disney, 877 F. Supp. 496, 499 (N.D. Ca. 1995)
(noting that it was pursuant to § 9(b) of 1909 Copyright Act by which President Eisenhower
obtained authority to toll time period for citizens of Austria to renew copyrights in United
States due to conditions in Austria at time).
12 See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, 189 F.2d 469, 472 (2d. Cir. 1951)
(holding that rights to motion picture derived from copyrighted novel do not extend beyond
time for which the novel was copyrighted, but could include any new material from play
based on novel which is in public domain), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951); Glaser v. St.
Elmo Co., 175 F. 276, 277 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) (holding that upon expiration of copyright on
novel, any person may use plot for play, copy or publish it, or make any other use deemed
fit); Ogilvie v. G. & C. Meriam, Co., 149 F. 858,863 (D. Mass. 1907) (holding that on expira-
tion of copyright of dictionary name, name and material therein became public property),
cert. denied, 209 U.S. 551 (1908); see also Ladd v. Law & Technology Press, 762 F.2d 809,
812 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[t]he primary purpose of the clause is to promote the arts
and sciences for the public good, not to grant an economic benefit to authors and inven-
tors"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986). But see Classic Film Museum, Inc. v. Warner
Bros., 453 F. Supp. 852, 855 (D. Me. 1978) (holding that although movie, which is deriva-
tive work of copyrighted play, has expired copyright and thus is in public domain, holders
of copyright on underlying play can enjoin party from performing movie because copyright
on story from play is still valid); King v. Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. 101, 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (holding that speech of Dr. Martin Luther King which had been publicly read and
disseminated to press in wide circulation did not cause speech to fall into public domain).
13 See Priv. L. No. 92-60, 85 Stat. 857,857 (1971). This Act restored copyrights in certain
works and granted them to a private religious group. Id.; United Christian Scientists v.
First Church of Christ, 829 F.2d 1152, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In United Christian Scientists
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law was held unconstitutional by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia as violative of the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment 14 and it was implied that
such a restoration may be violative of the "limited times" language
of the Copyright Clause.'- The only guidance on the issue from the
Supreme Court is illustrated in a discussion of the Constitutional
roots of Congress' power to grant patents. 16 The Court has opined,
in dicta, that Congress may not grant patents that will remove
knowledge or information from the public domain. 17
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered this private law
of Congress which granted the Christian Science Board of Directors, First Church of Christ
("First Church") copyrights in Mary Baker Eddy's various versions of Science and Health, a
text which was held sacred to both plaintiff and defendant. Id. The Court found the law
unconstitutional because Congress had improperly endorsed religion in violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id. The Court also noted that "[tihough Sci-
ence and Health is the pastor to Christian Scientists, it is not the office of Congress to grant
continual if indeed not perpetual, dominion over the text to First Church in order that it
may serve that end." Id.
14 United Christian Scientists, 829 F.2d at 1166 (finding special law that restored copy-
rights and granted them to religious sect violative of Establishment Clause); see U.S.
CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law respecting establishment of
religion . . ").
15 See United Christian Scientists, 829 F.2d at 1157. The Court described the private law
emphasizing its grant of copyrights to editions of Mary Baker Eddy's works that were in
the public domain because their general copyrights had lapsed or because they had never
been copyrighted. Id. The Court mused that editions of the text in question, that were in
the public domain at the time of the Act's passage, assumed the status of manuscripts
awaiting their "first publication," at which time only does a copyright term of 75 years
begin. Id. The grantees of the special copyright were therefore in a position to control the
publication of the sacred text for an indefinite period of time. Id. at 1157 n. 22; see also
§ 104A(aXl). A significant difference can be drawn between the special law considered in
United Christian Scientists, and the restoration that occurs under § 104A. Id. Section 104A
will only revive the copyright in eligible works for the remainder of the time it would have
had left if it had never fallen into the public domain. Id. The copyright holders do not start
over with an unpublished work. Id.; Katherine S. Deters, Retroactivity and Reliance Rights
Under Article 18 of the Berne Copyright Convention, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 971, 994
(1991). Deter's article suggests that the challenged law in United Christian Scientists vio-
lated the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee as well as its
Establishment Clause. Id.; Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535
(1993). Gordon's article discusses numerous suits enjoining publication as in United Chris-
tian Scientists. Id.; Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. Copy-
RiGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 137, 182 (1993). Samuels' article reiterates the facts and circumstances
surrounding the United Christian Scientists litigation. Id.
16 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (discussing consti-
tutional roots of Congress' power to grant patents).
17 See id. Congress' power to grant patents was considered not without limitations. Id.
As stated by Justice Clark: "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access
to materials already available." Id. This statement, however, may not have been meant to
extend to the copyright power because of a footnote in the same general discussion which
notes: "The provision appears in the Constitution spliced together with the copyright provi-
sion, which we omit as not relevant here." Id. at 6 n.1.
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The relevant consideration is not whether Congress will ever re-
store public domain works, because this it has already done.' 8
The question to be considered is whether this Act will withstand
constitutional scrutiny. In particular, § 104A restores foreign citi-
zens' copyrights but not American citizens' copyrights that have
fallen into the public domain for the same reasons.' 9 This unequal
treatment may be challenged by U.S. citizens, whose copyrights
were not restored, on equal protection and due process grounds.20
In this context, the issue of whether a citizen's access to federal
copyright will be deemed a fundamental constitutional right will
be a stumbling block for those challenging § 104A.2 ' Whether a
party has standing to challenge the Act22 and whether the party is
a member of a protected class are issues that are also likely to
stand in the way.23
Since Congress is removing works from the public domain and
placing copyrights in those works back into private hands, there
are likely to be those who have made significant investment in the
exploitation of these public domain works who will be subject to
18 See § 104A.
19 See § 104A(h)(4)(a) (defining "reliance party" as any person who continues to use re-
stored work after it is restored to its foreign owner); § 104A(h)(8)(a) (defining works eligible
for restoration as those that originated in source country "other than the United States");
see also 60 Fed. Reg. 50414 (1995) (regulations to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §§ 201, 202)
(providing that "[ain eligible country is a nation, other than the United States, that is a
member of the Berne Convention, or a member of the World Trade Organization, or is the
subject of a presidential proclamation"); cf Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 207 (testimony
of Professor Shira Perlmutter) ("[Tihe bills do not directly help American Authors; they
restore copyrights in foreign works only").
20 Cf Nimmer, Second Wind, supra note 6, at 32 nn. 6, 7 (noting that stakes are high in
that 30,000 movie titles and countless numbers of television episodes are presently eligible
and that real floodgate of copyright resurrection is likely to follow by American's demand-
ing resurrection of their works as well); Sobel, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing possibility that
Congress may have to resurrect American copyrights as well in order to placate disgruntled
Americans whose copyrights have fallen into public domain for same reasons).
21 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting that
Congress' power to grant copyrights is not for exclusive benefit of individual but avenue by
which important public purpose may be achieved); 2 NOWACK & ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON
CONsTrruTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.7, at 427-28 (2d ed. 1992) (discuss-
ing elusive definition of fundamental right and noting that such are generally rights which
are recognized as having value so essential to individual liberty that they merit constitu-
tional strict scrutiny).
22 See 2 NOWACK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 2.13, at 205 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the
concept of standing as prerequisite necessary to challenge statutes on constitutional
grounds, and noting that Court is reluctant to find standing when plaintiff is protesting
generalized injury to large class of persons).
23 See Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489 (1977) (hold-
ing that where statute does not negatively impact protected class, test for constitutionality
does not merit strict scrutiny review).
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suit by the restored copyright holder.2 4 Those parties who may
lose their investments in the exploitation of public domain works
may have a colorable claim against the U.S. government for just
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.25 Whether these parties have "property" that is entitled to
constitutional protection 21, and whether the government has in-
flicted a total loss of that property are likely to be central issues in
a challenge to § 104A brought on Takings Clause grounds.27
This Note will explore these possible constitutional challenges
to this novel legislation. Part I provides a brief discussion of for-
malities of American copyright law that have caused many copy-
rights to fall into the public domain due to of a failure of compli-
ance. Part II discusses the legislative history culminating in
Congress' restoration of foreign copyrights under § 104A. Part III
analyzes whether § 104A will survive constitutional attack based
on Due process or Equal Protection grounds. Finally, Part IV de-
termines whether the Act effects an unconstitutional taking with-
out just compensation. This Note concludes that § 104A will with-
stand a constitutional challenge under either an Equal Protection
and Due Process analysis or under a Takings Clause analysis.
I. THE FORMALITIES OF AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
American copyright protection was long conditioned on an au-
thor's compliance with formalities. 28 The copyright laws however,
24 See Nimmer, Second Wind, supra note 6, at 30 (noting that bulk of statutory text of
§ 104A relates to operation of § 104A's phase in provisions and restored copyright owners
rights to compensation from injunction against those whom are called reliance parties
under statute).
25 See U.S. CONST. amend V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation."); Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 208 (testimony of Professor Shira
Perlmutter) (discussing constitutionality of draft bill of § 104A and considering, in particu-
lar, whether bill would effect unconstitutional taking).
26 See Lansdsgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497 (1994) (noting that Tak-
ings Clause protects individuals only from government takings of vested property inter-
ests); cf Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) (holding that news-
paper carrier has vested interest in format of news matter although subject of news matter
itself is in public domain).
27 See Concrete Pipe and Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2291 (1993) (holding that mere diminution of value of property does
not effect unconstitutional taking by state); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7, 2895 n.8 (1992) (holding that only where property owner has been
deprived of all economically viable use of property does unconstitutional taking occur and
recognizing that distinction from situation when property owner has suffered mere diminu-
tion in value is sometimes elusive).
28 See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revo-
lutionary France and America, 64 TuL. L. REv. 991 passim (1990) (comparing relatively
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were purged of many formalities when superseded by the 1976
Copyright Act.29 Although failure to register a copyright no longer
forfeits a copyright under that Act, it remains a prerequisite for
filing a suit for infringement.30 Each registration still requires an
accompanying deposit of one or more copies of the work to be reg-
istered with the Library of Congress, whether published or unpub-
lished.3 1 In addition, the 1976 Act provides that the filing of a
copyright registration is prima facie evidence of a valid copy-
right.32 Failure to register a copyright within three months before
it is infringed limits the copyright holder to compensation for ac-
liberal french ideas of copyright to more stringent english historical notions from which
U.S. Constitution derives its historical basis); Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyright From
Formalities, 13 C ADozo ARTs & ENr. L. J. 565, 566 (1995) (discussing American copyright
law with particular emphasis on formalities that have "long been a hallmark of the Ameri-
can copyright system").
2 See 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (enacting the 1976 Copyright Act); see also H. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 5668, 5668 (describing scope
of 1976 Copyright Act and its effective abolishment of many formalities); Perlmutter, supra
note 28, at 568 (discussing impact of 1976 Act on American copyright formalities).
30 See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1995) (stating that "the owner of a copyright or of any exclu-
sive right in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim .. .. [but] [sluch
registration is not a condition of copyright protection"); 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1995) (stating that
.no action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registra-
tion of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title"); Techniques, Inc. v.
Rohn, 592 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that plaintiff must prove by writing
that they are successor in interest to registered copyright holder's right to bring infringe-
ment suit); International Trade Management, Inc. v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 402, 402-
03 (1982) (holding that before suit for infringement may be brought, plaintiff must wait for
copyright office to approve its application for copyright registration); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 408(d) (1995) (stating that "the Register may establish... procedures for the filing of an
application for supplementary registration, to correct an error in copyright registration");
Wales Industrial, Inc. v. Hasbro Bradley, 612 F. Supp. 510, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding
that technical mis-description in copyright registration identifying American transferee of
partial copyright to "Transformers" in lieu of Japanese creators, as claimant, does not for-
feit right to sue for infringement under 1976 Act).
3' 17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (1995); see Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124. This Act of Congress
enacted the first federally created Copyright Act. Id. Prior to the Copyright Act of 1909,
registration and deposit had to occur before publishing to avoid forfeiture of a copyright.
Id.; see also Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 40 (1939). The Washingto-
nian case relaxed this stringent rule. Id. Interpreting the 1909 Act, the Court found the
deposit requirement a prerequisite to maintaining suit for infringement, but, unless the
Registrar of the Copyright office demanded deposit, failure to deposit would not forfeit a
copyright. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 407(d) (1995). This concept was continued in the 1976 Act. Id.
There, a deposit is required within three months of the first publishing and the Register of
Copyrights may demand deposit anytime after publication, but the failure to comply re-
sults in a fine, not a forfeiture. Id.
32 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1995); see Harris Mkt. Research v. Marshall Mktg. & Communica-
tions, Inc., 948 F.2d 1518, 1526 (10th Cir. 1991) (interpreting statute and holding that
certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of validity of copyright); see also Autoskill,
Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., 994 F.2d 1476, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
three-part test to determine whether prima facie case of copyright infringement is met
includes whether plaintiff has established ownership of valid copyright).
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tual damages sustained, forfeiting any chance of receiving statu-
tory damages or attorney's fees.3
Until adherence to the Berne Convention 4 in 1989, appending
copyright notice to each copy of the work published in the United
States continued to be a prerequisite to retain copyright protec-
tion, unless the number of copies published without notice was
"relatively small."3 1 As early as 1946, however, the Second Circuit
ruled in Heim v. Universal Pictures36 that, unlike publication in
the U.S. without proper notice of a U.S. copyright, publication
abroad without such notice did not necessarily preclude the owner
from later obtaining a valid U.S. copyright.3 7
Even after enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright hold-
ers were required to apply at a certain time and in a certain form
to renew their copyright for a second term; failure to do so would
forfeit the second term.38 The 1976 Act did eliminate the renewal
requirement for any new copyrights in a prospective application,
but any work published prior to 1978 was still required to be for-
33 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1995).
34 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Revi-
sion 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention], reprinted in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LrrERARY AND
ARTISTIC WoRKs (Paris Act 1971) 177 (1978).
35 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1909); see 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 405 (1995) (providing that for works
publicly distributed before effective date of Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
omission of copyright notice invalidates copyright); Lifshitz v. Walter Drake & Sons, 806
F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that copyright holder has forfeited copyright by
publishing 15,000 copies with defective copyright notice). But see Eisen Durwood & Co. v.
Tolkien, 794 F. Supp. 85, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that first publication of "The Lord of
the Rings" trilogy in U.S. without copyright notice did not put work into public domain
because special provision known as ad-interim copyright under 1909 Copyright Act, but
does waive certain remedies otherwise available to author). See also Berne Convention Im-
plementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2858-9 (providing that omis-
sion of notice on copies and phonorecords distributed after effective date of Berne Conven-
tion no longer forfeits copyright); 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(1) (1995) (providing that omission of
copyright notice on "relatively small" number of copies does not invalidate copyright).
36 154 F.2d 480 (2d. Cir. 1946).
37 Id. at 486; see also Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Corp., 877 F. Supp. 496, 498
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that publication of work abroad without copyright notice did not
cause work to automatically fall into public domain).
38 See Act of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790) (providing for renewal of second
term); 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (same); see also Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Whitmark & Sons,
318 U.S. 643, 654 (1943) (holding that mere enactment of copyright act does not nullify
author's assignment of renewal rights to transferee if he is alive at time for renewal); Har-
ris v. Coca Cola Co., 73 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1934) (noting that renewal rights are not
automatic for current holder of copyright because it is a "recognition extended by the law to
the author of the work that has proven meritorious"); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Goff, 187 F. 247, 252 (1st Cir. 1911) (construing renewal right to allow author to capture
some benefit of his work that came into its own during its first term under publisher's
control).
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mally renewed. 9 Only in 1992 did Congress reverse this disparate
treatment of renewal by providing that all copyrights created
before the 1976 Act, due for renewal after 1992, would automati-
cally renew.4 °
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND COPYRIGHT RESTORATION
Foreign authors, as well as Americans, have been denied the
right to sue for infringement41 and their works have fallen into
the public domain because of a failure to comply with American
formalities.42 Since Congress has recently moved to reverse the
effects of these formalities, it is helpful, especially in a constitu-
tional analysis, to try to determine the congressional purpose in
enacting § 104A.4"
After much debate, the United States took a major step toward
trying to repair the rift between our copyright laws and those of
39 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1995).
40 See Automatic Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992) (provid-
ing for automatic renewal of copyrights created before 1976 act which have come up for
renewal after 1992); 17 U.S.C. § 304(3)(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1994) (providing that copyright
holders no longer must renew their copyright regardless when copyrighted); 17 U.S.C.
§ 304(a) (1995) (providing that filing for renewal is still allowed, though not mandatory, but
still affords copyright holder certain advantages in some situations with respect to when
rights vest).
41 See Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 191 (testimony of Professor Shira Perlmutter)
(noting that "as difficult as it has been for American authors to comply with the strict
formalities that were the hallmark of United States copyright law for so many years, it has
been even more difficult for foreign authors.").
42 See, e.g., Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Corp., 877 F. Supp. 496, 496 (N.D. Cal.
1995). In Twin Books the transferee of the Austrian author of Bambi's copyright was de-
nied an injunction against Disney because the daughter of the Austrian author failed to
renew her copyright in 1951. Id. This was despite a 1946 presidential proclamation ex-
tending the time to renew given the conditions existing in Europe at the time. Id. The
rationale of the decision can be stated as that the 28 year copyright term for the work, first
published in Austria without a copyright notice in 1923, and published with one in 1926,
began to run from the from the 1923 date and thus renewal in 1954 was not timely. Id. at
498. Along with this somewhat harsh decision, the Court in Twin Books also mentioned, in
dicta, that "Bambi" may have fallen into the public domain in the U.S. because Bambi was
first published in 1923 without a copyright notice pursuant to the 1909 Copyright Act in
force at that time. Id. This result would probably run afoul of the Heim v. Universal deci-
sion. See Heim v. Universal Pictures, 154 F.2d 480, 486 (2d. Cir. 1946). The Heim decision
held that publication abroad without copyright notice does not necessarily preclude the
copyright proprietor from obtaining a valid U.S. copyright. Id.; see also London Film Prod.
Ltd. v. Intercontinental Comm., 580 F. Supp. 47, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). One American court
has even held that diversity jurisdiction was proper to settle a suit based on infringement
of foreign copyrights which took place abroad, even when these works had lapsed into the
public domain in the United States. Id.
43 Cf Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 257 (1977)
(analyzing legislative purpose of statute in question in order to come to decision on consti-
tutionality); NOWACK & RoTuNDA, CONSTrrUrIONAL LAw § 14.2, at 598 (5th ed. 1995)
(describing judiciary's review of legislative purpose in face of equal protection challenge).
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the rest of the world by joining the Berne Convention on Copy-
rights in 1989.11 With Berne, Congress amended our copyright
laws to create a system more in sync with those of other Berne
nations, thus encouraging those nations to give American authors
reciprocal benefits abroad.1
5
Article 18(1) of the Berne Convention requires new members to
restore the copyright to a foreign work that has not fallen into the
public domain in its country of origin.4" The work to be restored
however, must have fallen into the public domain in the new coun-
try because of failure to comply with formalities that the new
country had previously required.4 7 Old members are required to
give reciprocal rights to new members.48 Accordingly, the retroac-
tive restoration of copyrights in certain foreign works in the U.S.,
as well as the restoration of American works in some foreign coun-
tries, should have occurred when the U.S. joined the Berne
convention.49
44 See Berne Convention, supra note 34, at 1; Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
45 See H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 6, at 6-7. This report states that "the purpose of the
legislation is to allow the United States to join the Berne Convention... the world's pre-
mier multilateral copyright treaty." Id. This Report, accompanying H.R. 4262, the bill im-
plementing amendments to the copyright law resulting from adoption of the Berne Conven-
tion, asserted that "the benefits of the legislation will be multifold." Id. According to the
Report, it established multi-lateral relations with twenty four member nations with whom
relations did not currently exist, it would play a role in larger trade relations with foreign
nations, it will maintain the collections of copyrighted works kept in the Library of Con-
gress, and place American copyright law on a footing similar to that of most other coun-
tries. Id.
46 See Deters, supra note 15, at 995 (discussing retroactively effective provisions of Arti-
cle 18 of Berne Convention and concluding that United States is substantially in violation
of those provisions); Gloria C. Phares, Retroactive Protection of Foreign Copyrights: What
Has Congress Be-Gatt?, 7 J. PROPRiETARY RTs. 2, available in 1995 Westlaw No. 4 JPROPR
2, *2 (noting that Article 18 of Berne Convention requires retroactive protection of copy-
rights that have fallen into public domain in joining nation for failure to comply with for-
malities previously required).
47 See Phares, supra note 46, at *2 (observing that works in copyright in country of ori-
gin should have been restored here when U.S. joined Berne despite author not having com-
plied with formalities of U.S. law).
48 See Deters, supra note 15, at 981 (discussing reciprocal retroactive rights under Arti-
cle 18 of Berne Convention).
49 Id.; Paul L. Sleven & Eric J. Weisberg, GATT Implementation Bill Restores Copyright
in Foreign Works, 42 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 272, 272 (1995). Sleven and Weisberg
noted that § 104A was enacted to comply with Berne and to improve United States' position
in its bid to seek retroactive protection in other Berne nations for American works. Id.
Other countries, particularly Russia, have refused to protect American works in the public
domain in Russia because of Congess' previous application of Article 18. Id.; see Broadcast-
ing Industry: Americans Pirating European Made Films, TECH. EUROPE, Mar. 6, 1992, at *1
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Allnews File. Europeans have complained that
although European files are theoretically protected in the United States without registra-
tion under the Berne Convention, in practice, European films are being pirated. Id.; see also
[Vol. 11:545
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Congress, however, seized on a paragraph in Article 18(3) of
Berne that allows a member country to determine how it will im-
plement the convention, and opted not to restore any copyrights.5 °
Congress found that the question of restoring copyrights from the
public domain raised constitutional issues. As a result, the poten-
tial stifling effect that such a restoration could have on our own
public domain merited at least further consideration.51 This policy
did not fare well with the intellectual property community abroad
and it diminished the chances of gaining reciprocal rights for
American authors, which rights were the purpose of joining the
Berne Convention. 52
Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 244. U.S. groups interested in § 104A have postulated that
if the U.S. fails to fully implement Article 18 of the Berne Convention, it will encourage our
trading partners to continue "legal piracy" of U.S. works. Id.
50 See H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 6, at 51 (noting that "considerable debate over
whether any recognition of the 'principle' of Article 18(1) of the Convention is absolutely
required in light of the sweeping discretion accorded states by Article 18(3)."); see Sobel,
supra note 2, at 4. According to Sobel, Congress thought that if a foreign work is in the
public domain in another country because its copyright in that country has expired, it is not
necessary for that country to grant retroactive protection to that work. Id. American copy-
right law has protected works that are unpublished without registration, until they were
published, at which time they were to be registered. Id. Congress took the position that the
foreign copyrights simply "expired" in the U.S. whenever they were published abroad, thus
exempting them from restoration. Id.; cf Heim v. Universal Studios, 154 F.2d 480, 486 (2d.
Cir. 1946). It is interesting to note the contrast of this finding to the holding of Heim v.
Universal which holds that publication abroad does not necessarily preclude a copyright
proprietor from obtaining a valid U.S. copyright. Id.
5' See H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 6, at 51. The Report elaborated:
The overall approach of the Committee to limit implementing amendments only to ar-
eas clearly in conflict with the text of the Convention has led the Committee to avoid
precipitous lawmaking in this delicate and important aspect of national copyright pol-
icy. The importance of maintaining intact the United States public domain of literary
and artistic materials - from the points of view of commercial predictability and funda-
mental fairness - argues strongly for legislative caution. The question of whether and,
if so, how Congress might provide retroactive protection to works now in our public
domain raises difficult questions, possibly with constitutional dimensions.
Id. See generally J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection Under the TRIPS Components of the WTO Agreement, 29 Iy'L LAw. 345, 367
(1995). Reichman noted that the restoration provisions in TRIPS conflict with the approach
that Congress took when the U.S. joined the Berne Convention in 1989. Id.
52 See Joint Hearings, supra note 2, (comments of Jason Berman, C.E.O. of Recording
Industry Association of America) (urging change in interpretation of Article 18 of Berne by
enacting retroactive restoration provision for the sake of American business abroad); id. at
133, 137 (testimony of Ira S. Shapiro, General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade
Representative) (discussing dissatisfaction of several Berne Union members with U.S. in-
terpretation of Article 18 and noting that convention does not provide for meaningful dis-
pute resolution process for them to seek redress for that dissatisfaction); id. at 244, 248-50
(summary statement of Eric H. Smith, Executive Director, International Intellectual Prop-
erty Alliance) (noting that other countries such as Thailand, Poland, Brazil and Russia
have relied on Congress' interpretation of Article 18 and have refused to restore any copy-
rights in their public domain from United States authors).
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In 1995, the issue was revisited with the Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") which required, inter
alia, the United States to comply with certain provisions of the
Berne Convention, at least one of which it chose not to implement
before: the restoration of foreign copyrights.53 The Act imple-
menting TRIPS,54 which includes the § 104A restoration, was in-
tended to complete the United States' compliance with Berne and
to provide foreign nations an incentive to give U.S. citizens recip-
rocal rights abroad. 55
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS
It is all but settled that the executive and the legislative
branches of the federal government cannot collectively enter into
treaties that serve to extend the power of the federal government
or derogate from any right reserved to the states or to United
53 See Text of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") Agreement, re-
printed in 47 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 230 (Jan. 13 1994) (publishing TRIPS agree-
ment); see also copyright provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement
"NAFTA", reprinted in 17 ENr. L. REP. 3, at *1 (June 1995) (publishing copyright provisions
of NAFTA; as Part of NAFTA United States had already entered into similar but less ex-
tensive agreement relating only to restoration of movies with Canada and Mexico, which
agreement has been included in, and superseded by, implementation act of GATT agree-
ment); 60 FED. REG. OF COPYRIGHTS No. 29, at 8252 (publishing list of 345 movies restored
under NAFTA); Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 133, 137 (testimony of Ira S. Shapiro,
General Counsel Office of The United States Trade Representative) (noting that NAFTA
was first step towards implementation of Article 18); Sobel, supra note 2, at *4 (discussing
§ 104A as it was first enacted pursuant to NAFTA and noting that "[wihile conceptually
significant, this first version of section 104A was of relatively little practical significance to
the American entertainment industry" because it only affected movies and not other
works). See generally Ysolde Gendrean, Copyright Harmonization in the European Union
and in North America, 20 COLum.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 37, 39 (1995) (noting that approach
taken to copyright protection under NAFTA is very different than that embraced by Euro-
pean Union); David Nimmer, GATT's Entertainment: Before and NAFTA, 15 Loy. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 133, 165 (1995) (discussing NAFTA's provisions that resurrect certain movies).
54 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 et seq. (1995).
The GATT implementing legislation makes a number of other changes to American copy-
right law including; § 511, which removes the "sunset" provision of the Computer Software
Rental Amendments Act of 1990 (17 U.S.C. § 109), §§ 512 and 513 which prohibit unau-
thorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos of live musical
performances, adding a new chapter 11 to Title 17 of the U.S. Code, and a new § 2319A, to
Title 18. Id.
55 See Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 1 (opening statements of Chairman Hughes)
(stating that "as U.S. authors and inventors increasingly rely on foreign markets, the need
for adequate foreign protection also increases."); id. at 244, 248 (summary statement of
Eric E. Smith, Executive Director International Intellectual Property Alliance) (stating
that "obtaining protection for U.S. movies, music, sound recordings, software, books and
other copyrighted works on a 'retroactive' basis has been one of the key trade objectives of
the last three administrations").
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States citizens by the Constitution. 56 The fact that TRIPS was
signed and has been implemented by law does not insure its' con-
stitutionality any more than any other act of Congress. 57 By its
own terms, § 104A, like other provisions of the Copyright Act,5
treats American citizens differently than foreign citizens by only
restoring the copyrights of foreign citizens.59 As such, it is conceiv-
able that § 104A will come under constitutional attack for viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. 60
The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment,
that all persons similarly situated will be treated similarly by the
law,61 by its terms contains only a prohibition of actions by state
governments." If a federal law, however, improperly classifies in-
dividuals in a way that would violate the equal protection guaran-
56 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that "the President] shall have power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur.. ."); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (stating that "[t]his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.. ."); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 (1957) (providing that "[n]o
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress... which is free from
the restraints of the constitution."); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (noting
that "[a]cts of Congress are the Supreme Law of the land only when made in pursuance of
the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so made under the authority of the
United States.").
57 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 159 (1803) (establishing concept ofjudicial review).
58 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) & (b) (1995) (stating that "[e]xcept for actions for infringe-
ment of copyright in Berne Convention works whose country of origin is not the United
States... no action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.").
59 § 104A(h)(4Xa). Section 104A defines a "reliance party" as any person who engages in
acts that would have violated § 106 (providing for exclusive copyright to a work) with re-
spect to a work from a "source country," if that source country were eligible for copyright
restoration at the time of the acts, and who continues to act in that way after the source
country is eligible for copyright restoration. Id. The "source country" of a work is defined as
"a nation other than the United States." § 104A(h)(8)(a); see also 60 Fed. Reg. 50414 (1995)(regulations to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §§ 201, 202 (1995)). This Copyright Office an-
nouncement attempted to clarify confusion and re-affirmed that an eligible country is a
nation, other than the United States, that is a member of the Berne Convention, or a mem-
ber of the World Trade Organization, or is the subject of a presidential proclamation. Id.; cf
Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 207 (testimony of Professor Shira Perlmutter). Professor
Perlmutter also emphasized that § 104A does not directly help American authors but only
restores copyrights in foreign works. Id.
60 Cf Sobel, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that Congress' treating foreigners more favorably
is likely to be seen by American authors whose works are in public domain as "counterin-
tuitive" and Congress may, as political matter find it hard to resist the importuning of
Americans for equal treatment).61 See generally Joseph Tussman and Jocobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CAL. L. Rav. 341, 343 passim (1949) (discussing well settled principles of equal
protection and classification).
62 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that [no State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
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tee if a state government had passed the same law, the federal law
will be held to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.63 By its words, the equal protection guarantee pertains to
the disparate treatment of "persons," not only U.S. citizens.6 4
A federal district court, when reviewing § 104A, will have to de-
termine if the section's classification implicates the equal protec-
tion guarantee by analyzing the congressional purpose of the clas-
sification, and by weighing this purpose against the Act's effect.65
The Supreme Court has held that classifications of suspect classes
or classifications that derogate from fundamental rights will be
independently analyzed to determine if the classification is neces-
sary to achieve a compelling governmental purpose.66 Classifica-
tions that implicate only economic or social welfare rights will be
reviewed with deference to legislative findings that the classifica-
tion is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose; the
63 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that racial classi-
fication made by federal law should be reviewed by standard lesser than strict scrutiny
under Fifth Amendment Due Process analysis), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097, 2111 (1995); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2 (1975)
(holding that eligibility for certain insurance benefit payments under Social Security Act
based on sex was violation of due process); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3
(1975) (holding statute requiring discharge of male military officer was violation of Due
Process given treatment of women in same scenario); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954) (holding that segregation in public education was not related to any government
objective and, even if equal facilities were provided, it is still violation of Due Process); see
also NOWACK & ROTUYNDA, supra note 43, § 14.1, at 1596 (noting that federal laws are scru-
tinized using same texts as state laws but classifications established by federal law are
reviewed under implied equal protection guarantee of Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause).
64 See U.S. CoNsT. amends. I-X. Many other provisions of the Bill of Rights contain the
word "persons" in lieu of "citizens," including the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Id.; see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that Due Pro-
cess rights are enjoyed by non-citizens); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (con-
cluding that discrimination violates equal protection and Fourteenth Amendment).
65 Cf Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 257 (1977)
(analyzing legislative purpose of statute in question); NOWACK & ROTUNDA, supra note 43,
§ 14.2, at 598. Nowack & Rotunda describe the judiciary's review of legislative purpose in
the face of an equal protection challenge. Id. The legislation's desired ends are often deter-
minative of whether persons affected by it are similarly situated with regard to the govern-
ment's action. Id. Once the reviewing court has determined the statute's intended purpose,
and found that purpose in itself constitutionally valid, the court may then review the stat-
utes classification in terms of that purpose. Id.
66 See, e.g., Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498-99 (reviewing segregation in public schools);
NowAcx & ROTUNDA, supra note 43, § 14.3, at 601-02. Under this test, the Justices do not
defer to the legislature's reasons for including a classification. Id. They independently re-
view the statute's purposes and ends to determine whether the classification is necessary
and sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling or overriding government inter-
est. Id. The government has the burden of proving the statute's validity when issues of
fundamental rights are at stake. Id.
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classifications must have a "rational basis."6 7 A third, "intermedi-
ate" level of review which has evolved questions whether classifi-
cations based on gender or illegitimacy have a substantial rela-
tionship to an important government interest.68
In cases involving federal classifications based on citizenship,
that discriminate against aliens, the Supreme Court has indicated
that it will apply only the rational basis test or in rare cases, the
intermediate test.69 These deferential standards have been used
in cases implicating foreigners because the federal government is
charged with the unique responsibility of regulating foreign af-
fairs.7 ° Section 104A, however, presents the opposite scenario; it
favors foreign citizens rather than discriminating against them.
The Supreme Court has provided little, if any, direction in this
area. Thus, to some degree, what type of rights are implicated by
§ 104A, and as a result what standard to apply, are open
questions.7 '
67 See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (reviewing individuals inhib-
ited access to bankruptcy court due to fees that are exacted which lack requisite rational
basis); NOWACK & ROTUNDA, supra note 43, § 14.3, at 601. Under this standard, the Court
will not review the decisions of the legislature to classify persons in terms of economics. Id.
The Justices have decided that the reasonableness of a statute's attempt to address a legiti-
mate governmental problem in a way that does not infringe on Constitutionally protected
rights is the province of the legislature and nothing more can be gained by their review. Id.
68 See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1990) (using intermedi-
ate test standard to determine constitutionality of federal affirmative action program),
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that state violated Equal Protection Clause by deny-
ing free public education to children of foreign citizens living in United States illegally).
69 See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (invalidating 5 C.F.R.
§ 338.101 (1971) and holding that United States Civil Service Commission could not bar
resident aliens from employment in competitive civil service); see Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 84 (1976) (holding that Congress could condition alien's eligibility for participation
in federal medical insurance program on five consecutive years of residence in United
States).
70 See generally Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAils AND THE CoNsTrrbON 257 (1972). Pro-
fessor Henkin discusses classifications that our national policy makes between foreign na-
tionals here in the United States vis a vis American citizens. Id. He notes that although
foreign nationals that are within United States jurisdiction are entitled to Equal Protec-
tion, distinctions that are made between different nationalities which reflect the federal
government's relations with other nations are apparently not of such constitutional con-
cern. Id. He suggests that this type of distinction may be permissible if its purpose is to
seek reciprocity for Americans in those countries or even to implement general policy to-
wards the alien's government. Id.
71 It is submitted that the Court may apply the same rational relationship test to federal
citizenship cases that discriminate against American citizens as is presented in the case of
§ 104A. It is also submitted, however, that the present effect of discrimination against
American citizens in favor of foreign citizens deserves heightened scrutiny.
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The Supreme Court has considered, however, the affect of fed-
eral regulation on a citizen's right to international travel.72
Clearly, states cannot enact laws that favor one group of citizens
over another based on how long they have been citizens of a
state73 when certain fundamental rights are involved, because it
inhibits the unqualified right to interstate travel.74 In the federal
arena however, the Supreme Court in Califano v. Torres75 consid-
ered a Puerto Rican's claim that he was entitled to welfare bene-
fits when he moved from the mainland back to Puerto Rico.76 In
comparing the right to interstate travel to the right to interna-
tional travel, the Court concluded that the "right" of international
travel has been treated as "no more than an aspect of the 'liberty'
protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
.... , As such, it was thought that the right of international
travel could be regulated "within the bounds of due process."78
The Court cited its decisions in Kent v. Dulles79 and Aptheker v.
Secretary of State ° in support of the proposition that a due pro-
cess analysis, rather than an equal protection analysis, governs
the review of the right of international travel."' Both cases consid-
ered the question of whether the Secretary of State had the right,
in the interest of national security, to deny passports to American
72 See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 n.6 (1978) (discussing affect of federal regulation
denying benefits on right to international travel when citizen moves from mainland to Pu-
erto Rico).
73 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982). In Zobel, the Supreme Court held that a
state law that distributes income from its natural resources to adult citizens in varying
amounts depending on the duration of their residence in the state violated the equal protec-
tion rights of newer state citizens. Id.; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 650 (1969). In
Shapiro it was held that a state standard that gauges eligibility for welfare benefits on the
duration of the citizen's residence violates equal protection because it inhibited the funda-
mental constitutional right to interstate travel. Id. In reaching that decision, the Court
held that the standard to be applied would be whether the measure promoted a compelling
state interest. Id. It is submitted that an analogy lies to the present analysis in that both
involve an equal protection challenge based on an individual's status as a citizen of a par-
ticular sovereignty.
74 See Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-106 (1971) (embedding right to inter-
state travel in Supreme Court jurisprudence); U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (dis-
cussing constitutional right to interstate travel).
75 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
76 Id. at 1.
77 Id. at 5 n.6.
78 Id. (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 379 U.S. 809 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500, 505-06 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958)).
79 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
80 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
81 See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 n.6 (1978) (citing authorities that address right to
international travel).
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citizens who were communists.82 The Kent decision left open the
question of what standard of review should be applied in deter-
mining what extent the right of international travel could be cur-
tailed under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 3
The question was considered again in Aptheker where the Court
iterated the vague standard: "[Tihe Constitution requires that the
powers of government must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe a constitutionally protected
freedom."84 The Court analyzed the purpose of the act in question
and found that it was excessive in relation to its purpose. The
Secretary of State unsuccessfully argued that the Act's overriding
purpose was to prevent espionage, sabotage, terrorism and other
fears of the cold war."5 The question is submitted that if the gov-
ernment's intention to prevent these clear evils is not enough to
curtail constitutionally protected freedoms, what will result when
the Court is faced with the government's intention of securing bet-
ter copyright protection for American citizens?
Similarly, in Kennedy v. Mendoza Martinez,86 the Court consid-
ered claims by two American citizens that were deprived of United
States citizenship by federal legislation when they remained
abroad during times of war and failed to answer the nation's call
to arms.87 The Court held that the government deprived these citi-
zens of their constitutional right to citizenship secured by the
82 Kent, 357 U.S. at 128 (finding that discretion of Secretary of State was inappropriate);
see also Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 515 (holding that issuance of passport was within Secretary's
discretion).
83 Kent, 357 U.S. at 120-27 (discussing merits of international travel and ultimately de-
clining to decide to what extent freedom of international travel could be curtailed).
84 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964) (quoting Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940)). The Court noted further that the freedom of interna-
tional travel is a liberty closely related to the rights of free speech. Id. at 517. Therefore,
the appellants were not required to demonstrate that Congress could have written a stat-
ute that did not limit their constitutional right to travel. Id. It is submitted that the Court
by such an assertion indicated that heightened scrutiny was appropriate without directly
stating it. Id.
85 Id. at 509; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.2 (1969). In Shapiro, the
Court compared other privilege type rights to the right of interstate travel and noted that it
made no ruling on the validity periods or residence requirements used in determining eligi-
bility to vote, for tuition free education, to practice professions, etc. Id. The Court stated
that such requirements could promote compelling state interests, or, may not inhibit citi-
zens' constitutional right to interstate travel. Id. In comparison, it is submitted that if you
consider the "constitutional right" to have a copyright the grant of a privilege or license, or
if you consider the legislative purpose behind § 104A compelling, then you do not have a
violation of equal protection. If you consider the right to have a copyright fundamental in
any respect, however, then a very different constitutional protection for that right follows.
86 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
87 Id. at 165.
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Fourteenth Amendment,"8 without the due process guaranteed to
them by the Fifth Amendment. 9 The Court noted that Congress'
powers to regulate the Nation's foreign affairs are indeed subject
to the constitutional requirements of the Due Process Clause. 90
Although these cases deal with the fundamental right of citizen-
ship and the right to international travel, they can provide insight
as to the likely result of a constitutional analysis of § 104A. The
right of Congress to declare when and in what situations works
have fallen into the public domain has heretofore been undisputed
because it is one of its enumerated powers. 91 Congress giveth and
Congress taketh away, but like the right to grant and withdraw
citizenship, Congress should grant or withdraw the privilege of
copyright without undue infringement of fundamental rights of
American citizens. 92
The removal of works from the public domain that are already
available for general exploitation, and restoration of the copyright
in such works to a foreign citizen, may implicate fundamental free
speech rights93 of every American citizen.9 4 In a loosely analogous
88 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States"); see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898) (holding that
citizenship is right protected by Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be denied to person of
chinese descent merely because of alienage).
89 Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 165-66.
90 Id. at 164-65.
91 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to grant copyrights for "limited
times"). Since the power to grant copyright protection is one of the enumerated powers in
the Constitution, it is submitted as a reasonable conclusion that if § 104A had never been
enacted the American citizens whose copyrights have fallen into the public domain for fail-
ure to comply with the formalities would have no reasonable expectation to ever again
enjoy copyright protection. Thus, an argument could be posed that if they had no expecta-
tion, then they have no right to be disappointed now. Cf Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 566 (1972). Like the situation here considered, the Roth decision held that the govern-
ment benefits there considered were Fourteenth Amendment property only when the recip-
ient had a legitimate expectation that he will continue receiving them. Id.
92 Cf Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (holding that where substantive
property right to government benefit is established courts, not legislature have final word
on constitutional need for procedural safeguards for it); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539
(1971) (holding that government must have fair procedure to determine when and why
driver's license will be granted or revoked); In re Ruffallo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968) (holding
that attorney's disbarment could not occur until he and accuser had testified to all material
facts and were otherwise afforded Due Process of law). See generally Peter N. Simon, Lib-
erty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CAL. L. RE. 146,
146 (1983) (explaining that Perry Roth doctrine dictates that legislatures create property
and courts protect it).
93 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech").
94 Cf Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 756 (1976) (noting that First Amendment protection is afforded to communication and
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situation in Goldstein v. California,95 the Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a state statute that prohibited record
and tape piracy." The petitioner's challenged their conviction
under the statute on the grounds that federal policies inherent in
the federal copyright statute were infringed upon by the state
measure. 97 In this context, the Court held that "[t]he objective of
the Copyright Clause was clearly to facilitate the granting of
rights national in scope."981
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that congressional
power to grant monopoly privileges in the form of copyrights is not
designed to benefit the individual but designed to achieve an im-
portant public purpose. 9 Since the Court has provided clear state-
ments that rights granted under the Copyright Clause are na-
tional in scope, and that the copyright power must be used to
benefit the American public at large, it might be said that Con-
gress has mishandled important rights of American citizens in its
fast track enactment of § 104A. 100
not communicator); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 149 (1959) (stating that there is no
longer doubt that freedom of speech is within liberty protected by Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment) (quoting Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,
707 (1931)); see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (interpreting
First Amendment speech protection as method of guaranteeing that there is forum for free
exchange of ideas to bring about political and social change). But see Ladd v. Law & Tech-
nology, 762 F.2d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 1985) (answering a copyright holder's challenge to re-
quirement of depositing two copies of publication with Library of Congress under Copyright
Act and holding that such requirement is not undue burden on free speech rights), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986).
95 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
96 Id. at 549-50.
97 Id. at 551. The petitioner's also challenged the statute on the grounds that the statute
created a "copyright" in perpetuity in contravention of the copyright clause. Id. The Court
took the petitioner's pre-emption argument seriously and noted that the Court's decision in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 U.S. 299 (1851), precipitated their need to inquire whether
the state statute was "absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant" to the power
granted to the federal government in the Constitution. Id. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 32, at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961)).
98 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 555 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (B.
Wright ed. 1961)). The Court held, however, that they would not construe the Copyright
Clause as a completely exclusive grant of copyright power because some related matters
are local and of no national import. Id. at 558.
99 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). The Court
explained, with these and other statements, that the power of Congress to grant and re-
move copyrights must be tempered with the rights of the public to the "free flow of ideas,
information and commerce." Id.
100 Cf Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 207 (testimony of Professor Shira Perlmutter).
Professor Perlmutter argued that it is possible that a retroactive grant of protection to
existing public domain works does not adhere to the constitutional mandate of promoting
the progress of science in the United States. Id. She observed that the restored copyright
holders no longer needed an incentive to create because their works have already been
created. Id.
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Just because a right is national in scope, however, does not
mean that it is a fundamental right.'' The nature of a copyright
is in some ways only an organization of individuals economic
rights with regard to a particular work of intellectual property.' 0 2
It has also been suggested that since § 104A will, over time,
strengthen the position of American authors in international copy-
right relationships by bolstering their rights to both future and
existing copyright protection, these positive economic effects
should justify restoring only foreigners copyrights. 10 3 Further-
more, it has been suggested that what Congress has effected is not
a grant of new rights to foreign copyright holders. Rather, Con-
gress has only ensured that foreigners receive the benefit of the
American copyright protection that has already been made
available. 10 4
In any event, it is difficult to argue that an American citizen
whose copyright was not restored under § 104A has suffered an
injury to the fundamental right of free speech in a greater degree
101 See NOWACK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 15.7, at 427-28 (2d ed. 1992). Nowack and
Rotunda have provided commentary on the elusive definition of what a fundamental right
is according to the Supreme Court. Id. The authors note that fundamental rights are those
that are recognized as having value so essential to individual liberty that they merit strict
scrutiny review. Id. Beyond that, Nowack and Rotunda submit that there is little other
guidance towards a finite definition of fundamental right except to say that it is a "modern
recognition of the natural law concepts first espoused by Justice Chase." Id.; cf. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Griswold found
a fundamental "right to privacy" infringed by a law which prohibited the use of contracep-
tives by married persons. Id. This right, he found sprang from "penumbras" of several
rights found in the Bill of Rights. Id. Justice Goldberg, on the other hand, in his concurring
opinion, did not feel obliged to find textual penumbras in the Constitution to support this
fundamental right. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J. concurring). Americans' access to federal copy-
right finds its origins in the text of the Constitution itself, but it is submitted that the Court
itself is as unclear on whether a fundamental right must itself be in the text of the Consti-
tution, as it is on whether all rights contained in the Constitution could be deemed funda-
mental simply because contained therein.
102 Cf United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 n.4 (1938) (noting that
Court would henceforth exercise lesser scrutiny in analyzing statutes that affect rights
deemed to be economic in nature); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397, 584
(1937) (holding that if state measure regulating contracts has reasonable relation to legis-
lative purpose, requirements of Due Process are satisfied); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 54 (1905) (holding that state, not federal government, has power to regulate contracts
as police power inherent in state sovereignty).
103 See Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 208 (testimony of Professor Shira Perlmutter)
(discussing long-term effects of retroactive copyright protection for American authors that
will result from restoration of foreign works in United States).
104 See id. While considering whether § 104A met the requirement of promoting the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts, Professor Perlmutter noted that if § 104A's intended
long-term effects did not meet this requirement, no protection for foreigners' copyrights
would be justified. Id. To be fair, Professor Permutter was speaking in the context of
whether § 104A would effect a compensable taking under Fifth Amendment analysis, a
topic discussed in Part V of this Note.
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than any other American. 10 5 Another problem relating to the
equal protection analysis, is that it is difficult to pose an argument
that an American citizen, by virtue of his citizenship, is a member
of any protected class. 10 6
Justice Holmes once described the equal protection challenge as
"the last resort of constitutional arguments."0 7 This is likely to be
true for a party resorting to a such a challenge to § 104A. Justice
Holmes' words ring especially true when considering a challenge
to a federal statute, such as § 104A, that is enacted to address
what is deemed to be important to the nation's foreign policy and
international industry. In light of the foregoing, it is unlikely that
a challenge to § 104A on equal protection or due process grounds
will prevail.
105 See NOWACK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 2.13, at 205. The authors note that if a
plaintiff were challenging a statute based on a generalized constitutional injury, the Court
will be more reluctant to find standing because it will then precipitate the need to address a
potentially overbroad constitutional claim. Id. If the plaintiff, however, is arguably within a
clearly defined class of persons affected by the measure, then standing may be found. Id.
Thus when Congress has acted, the authors allege the requirements of Article III remain:
the plaintiff still must state a claim for a distinct and a palpable injury to itself, even if it is
an injury shared by a large class. Id.; see also Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976) (stating that plaintiffs must allege some threatened or
actual injury before court has jurisdiction) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501(1975); Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1043 (8th Cir.
1988), affd, 911 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that plaintiff has burden of proving
standing where defendant contests its factual basis); cf Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at
207-08 (testimony of Professor Shira Perlmutter). Professor Perlmutter theorized that if
each amendment to the copyright law must provide incentive to creation, the Congress
could never curtail copyright protection in scope or term, even for works created in the
future. Id. She calls for a weighing of the benefits that the American intellectual property
community will receive from the policies of the copyright laws as a whole. Id. Those bene-
fits include, she adds, other countries willingness to grant retroactive protection to Ameri-
can works. Id.
106 See Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489 (1977). The
Hodory case held that where a statute did not involve any discernable fundamental inter-
est nor did it affect with particularity any protected class, the test for constitutionality was
whether the statute had a rational relation to a legitimate state interest. Id. In addition, it
has been suggested to the Author that perhaps equal protection analysis doesn't apply
since § 104A distinguishes only between citizens and non-citizens. Thus, a class of foreign-
ers, as opposed to aliens, not physically located within the jurisdiction of the United States
may not be within the reach of the equal protection clause which only protects those "per-
sons within its jurisdiction." Cf U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. This section provides that
"Wo State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id. It is submitted, however, that foreigners must acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States in order to enforce a copyright granted by the United States.
Furthermore, that they have an American copyright should satisfy, in most cases, the req-
uisite minimum contacts and purposeful availment necessary for personal jurisdiction over
a foreign citizen in a suit relating to that copyright. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct.
of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). In comparison, the Court held in Asahi that only where
there is a substantial connection between the forum and the defendant can there be per-
sonal jurisdiction. Id.
107 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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IV. THE "TAKINGS" CHALLENGE
The most obvious constitutional challenge to § 104A will be that
it effects a taking of private property by the federal government
without just compensation when it is applied to parties who had
been legally exploiting public domain works that are subsequently
restored.10 8 These parties, called "reliance parties" by § 104A,' 0 9
may have made investments in such exploitation and will now be
forced to abandon their use of the work or to seek costly licenses
from the copyright owners in order to continue to use the work. 10
The most basic obstacle to challenging §104A under the Takings
Clause is a conceptual difficulty in characterizing a party's non-
exclusive use of a work that is in the public domain as "property,"
regardless of the breadth of investment that party has put into its
exploitation."1 The answer may be analogous to the rule of cap-
ture which determines when wild animals have been reduced to
possession. 1 12 Or, just as the Supreme Court has recognized a
newspaper carrier's "quasi property right" in news that has cur-
rent commercial value within the public domain; so, too, might the
108 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating "nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.").
109 See § 104A(d)(2). This section provides for enforcement of copyright in restored works
as against reliance parties. Id.; § 104A(h)(4)(A)-(C). A "reliance party" means a person who
used the work which now has a restored copyright, before it was restored, and who contin-
ues to use the copyrighted work after the date of restoration. Id.
110 See § 104A(a)(1). The restored copyright vests automatically on the effective date of
restoration. Id.; Presidential Proclamation No. 6780, 60 Fed. Reg. 15845 (1995). President
Clinton has announced that effective date of TRIPS is January 1, 1996. Id.; Copyright Of-
fice Notice of Policy Decision, 60 Fed. Reg. 7793 (1995). Clinton's proclamation has been
implemented by the Copyright Office. Id.; see also § 104A(c), (d)(2). The copyright owner
must file a "notice of intent to enforce" with the Copyright Office, or serve such a notice
directly on a reliance party, before enforcement is possible. Id.; § 104A(d)(2). The reliance
party has twelve months after receiving either actual notice from receipt of a notice of
intent to enforce, or constructive notice from the date that there is publication of the notice
of intent to enforce by the Copyright Office in the Federal Register, before enforcement is
possible. Id.
111 See General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs: Intellectual Property Provisions, Joint
Hearings on H.R. 4894 and S. 2368 before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judi-
cial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (Serial No. 90) and the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Serial No. J-
103-77), 103 Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1994) [hereinafter "Justice Department Memorandum"]
(prepared statement of Christopher Schroeder, Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice) (noting that Fifth Amendment's Tak-
ings Clause prevents Legislature from depriving private persons of vested property rights
except for public use and upon payment of just compensation (quoting Landsgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497 (1994))).
112 See id. (positing that investment that reliance party puts into public domain work
may be analogously equivalent to control of wild animal (citing Pierson v. Post, 2 Am. Dec.
264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805))).
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Court recognize a person's investment in exploitation of materials
that are in the public domain as property.113
It is submitted that a subtle distinction exists between intellec-
tual property in its various forms and other property as related to
takings claims.114 In Dowling v. United States,'1 5 the Supreme
Court discussed whether a copyright is itself property that can be
converted or stolen in the context of a criminal statute or tort law
case. 116 The Court opined that the rights of a copyright holder are
distinct from the possessory interest of the physical property
owner because the copyright holder's rights are subject to pre-
cisely defined limits.1 1 7 It was held that although a person may be
subject to criminal penalties or fines under the Copyright Act for
egregious copyright infringement, such person cannot be held to
have stolen or converted the copyright."' Thus, intellectual prop-
113 See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) (recogniz-
ing dual character of news matter, and finding that although substance of news was free for
all to use, "particular form or collocation" in which news service disseminates is copyright-
able as literary production).
114 See Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508, 509 (1931). In Waite the Supreme Court
construed a statute to grant recovery of "entire compensation" for unlicensed use of a pat-
ented invention by the United States. Id. The Court remarked that the statute was in-
tended to establish complete justice between the United State and the plaintiff. Id.; James
v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881). In Campbell, the Court held that the congressional
grant of patents creates in the patentee an exclusive property right which cannot be appro-
priated or used by the government any more than the government could appropriate land
for its use, without just compensation. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1995). When
§ 1498(b) was enacted in 1960, it provided a copyright holder with its sole remedy against
the government for copyright infringement. Id. It provides that the copyright owner's "ex-
clusive remedy" shall be the "recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation as dam-
ages" for the government's infringement. Id.; Calhoun v. United States, 453 F.2d 1385,
1391 (1972). In Calhoun, the U.S. Court of Claims described the § 1498's patent provisions,
which allow a patent holder's infringement suit, as an avenue to get just compensation
when the government exercises eminent domain over the patent. Id. The court further as-
serts that the "patentee obtains his Fifth Amendment compensation for [the government's]
taking" through his suit against the government. Id. It is submitted that this is an indica-
tion that the precise remedy of § 1498, "entire compensation," was chosen to satisfy consti-
tutional standards in both the patent and copyright provisions of § 1498. Turton v. United
States, 212 F.2d 354, 355 (6th Cir. 1954). Prior to 1960, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
precluded finding the federal government liable for copyright infringement. Id.
115 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 217. The precise question before the Court in Dowling was whether a federal
criminal statute that provided penalties for the interstate shipping of stolen goods contem-
plated the inclusion of penalties for shipments of bootlegged "or pirated sound recordings
and motion pictures whose unauthorized distribution infringed valid copyrights." Id. at
213.
118 Id. at 217. The Court in Dowling concluded that there was no dispute in the case
whether bootlegging of copyrighted works constituted copyright infringement. Id. The
Court stated that it was not comfortable, however, with the analogy that bootlegging copy-
righted materials is like the physical removal of physical property which was offered by the
government. Id.
568 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:545
erty is "taken" on a different conceptual level than ordinary per-
sonal or real property." 9 With this precedent, it is submitted that
a subtle distinction will evolve between takings cases that deal
with intellectual property, and those that deal with personal or
real property. 120 If you eliminate one's access to intellectual prop-
erty, it is submitted that you have not deprived that person of
property, per se, but of the ability to exploit the particular expres-
sion of ideas represented by what labeled intellectual property.
119 See id.; Unix Sys. Labs., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 790, 790
(D.N.J. 1993). In Unix Systems, the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey held that in order to prove a takings claim, the requirement that private property
has been taken is satisfied because trade secrets as intellectual property are considered
property under state law. Id.; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-01
(1984). In Ruckelshaus, the Supreme Court considered a takings claim based on the gov-
ernment's dissemination of trade secrets after submission of the same to a federal agency.
Id. A statutory provision required the plaintiff to submit certain trade secrets as part of
data disclosure provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. Id. at
1010. The submitter of the data was entitled to disclose with the proviso that such trade
secrets were not to be disclosed to others outside the agency. Id. The court failed to grant
the plaintiff relief, because the plaintiff had not yet pursued its statutorily created remedy
of arbitration and thus could potentially have recovered some value from the arbitration
proceeding. Id. at 1013-14. Although the EPA's actions could not be a taking without com-
pensation, the court did hold that it would constitute a taking if the arbitration proceeding
did not yield adequate compensation to the plaintiff for its loss in market value to its trade
secrets. Id. The Court recognized that the property value of a trade secret lied in its unique
nature as something that the plaintiff had and that its competitors did not. Id. at 1013. The
Court indicated that the property right of the Plaintiffs trade secret lies in its exclusive-
ness, or its unique nature as irreplaceable, and the plaintiff had a right to keep this infor-
mation from its competitors. Id. at 1012. The agency argued that federal pre-emption dic-
tates that the agency's purpose in disseminating the trade secrets is valid, regardless of the
state law's characterization of trade secrets as property. Id. The Court stated that if the
agency could preempt state property law in that way, "then the taking clause has lost all
vitality," and rejected the agency's argument. Id. at 1012-13.
120 See Radioptics, Inc. v. United States, 621 F.2d 1113, 1126 (1980). In Radioptics, the
United States Court of Claims considered a claim that the government had disclosed the
plaintiffs new technology to competitors, and such disclosure amounted to a taking. Id. at
1126. The plaintiff alleged that it was due compensation just as when a patent is revoked or
denied by the government. Id. at 1128. Since the plaintiff had not patented the technology,
and furthermore since there was no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the
government giving rise to a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff was denied relief. Id. at
1130. The Court also denied jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claim of misappropriation of
trade secrets based on state law. Id. at 1128; see also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1012-13.
Thus the Court of Claims never reached the question that was raised but not decided by the
Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus four years later. Id. But see Mihalek Corp. v. State of
Mich., 821 F.2d 327, 327-28 (6th Cir. 1987); Mihalek Corp. v. State of Mich., 814 F.2d 290,
290-91 (6th Cir. 1987). In Mihalek, in two reported opinions, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held squarely that there is no taking under the Fifth Amendment unless the state
uses, appropriates or benefits from a copyright holder's ideas, materials, or advertising con-
cept, or the plaintiff otherwise proves a copyright infringement case. Id. In Mihalek, the
Sixth Circuit could not determine, however, what result if the government had in fact in-
fringed on the plaintiffs copyright because they found that the government had not in-
fringed. Id.
1996] GATT AND FOREIGN COPYRIGHT
Intellectual property decisions need to recognize that the value of
a given work is predicated on its unique nature.'2 1
Employing similar logic, authorities on the subject have advised
Congress that there is a distinct difference between those who the
statute labels reliance parties and those who have created a deriv-
ative work based on a previously public domain work. 122 Owners
of derivative works have created intellectual property of their
own.' 23 The statute as enacted heeds the aforementioned advice
by providing for a compulsory license to allow the owner of the
derivative work to continue to exploit the work indefinitely upon
payment of fees to the restored copyright's owner.' 24 As such, it is
less of a loss for the derivative work holder, however, it may not be
altogether fair. 125
Of course, the question that will arise under § 104A will not be
whether the appropriation of intellectual property constitutes a
taking because a reliance party has no rights in the work itself.'2 6
121 Cf Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1013 (recognizing that property value of trade secret
lied in its unique nature as something that plaintiff had and its competitors did not).
122 See Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 178 (testimony of Eugene Volokh) (distinguish-
ing derivative work holders from other potential reliance parties and implying that it may
not be enough to just distinguish them); id. at 209 (testimony of Professor Shira Perlmut-
ter) (discussing how Congress should distinguish owners of derivative works from other
reliance parties, and give former broader rights).
123 See id. at 209 (testimony of Professor Shira Perlmutter) (noting that unlike other
reliance parties, derivative work owners have property protected under copyright law and
further noting that derivative work holders should not be barred from exploiting their
works after twelve months by restored copyright owner).
124 See § 104A(d)(3)(A) (providing that in case of derivative work based on restored work,
reliance party may continue to exploit work if reliance party pays reasonable compensation
for conduct which would be subject to remedy for infringement but for § 104A); Nimmer,
Second Wind, supra note 6, at 30 (discussing this provision of § 104A and noting that it
amounts to type of faux compulsory license, whereby current exploiters of derivative works
pay compensation to current owner of copyright).
125 Cf Nimmer, Second Wind, supra note 6, at 30. Nimmer discussed difficult issues that
will arise in determining what will constitute "reasonable compensation." Id. He remarks
that § 104A provisions whereby the parties may reach a satisfactory agreement as to what
amounts the reliance party derivative work holder will have to pay the restored copyright
holder. Id. Failing that, the parties must then resort to a U.S. district court, where the
court will attempt to set a fair figure. Id.
126 Cf Wales Indus. v. Hasbro Bradley, 612 F. Supp. 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (explain-
ing rationale behind 1976 Act's doctrine of divisibility whereby person other than copyright
owner can gain a property right in work and noting under this doctrine "whereby a copy-
right owner may transfer less than all of his copyrights ... it is the exclusiveness of the
rights transferred... that is essential"); see also Library Publications, Inc. v. Medical Eco-
nomics Co., 548 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that copyright owner may
transfer copyright in whole or in part to another only if transfer is evidenced by writing),
affd, 714 F.2d 123 (3d. Cir. 1983); NMMaMR, NnnMR ON COPYRIGHT § 10.02[A], at 10-20
(1985) [hereinafter NnMR ON CoPyRIGHT] (discussing principles of rights transfer in copy-
right law (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess., at 123 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5659, 5739)); Samuels, supra note 15, at 156-66 (stating that one com-
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Rather, the question will be whether the economic investment in
the public domain work is compensable property under Fifth
Amendment analysis.1 27 At this point, it is necessary to assume
that a reliance party has at least some type of property interest
which may be entitled to protection from government takings.
A. The Doctrine of Non-Divisibility
The U.S. Department of Justice prepared a legal memorandum
on the potential takings problems with § 104A which concluded
that § 104A will not effect a taking when viewed in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions on the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause.12 8 The Justice Department's opening salvo relates to the
concept of non-divisibility of property in Fifth Amendment takings
cases. 2s The Court has announced that Takings Clause compen-
sable property cannot be divided to demonstrate that a portion of
a larger property was completely taken and should be treated as
distinct from the property remaining. 130 This is what is known as
the non-divisibility doctrine. 131 The premise of the non-divisibility
argument is that since § 104A allows a reliance party twelve
months in which to sell his existing copies or phonorecords, and
may in any case be able to secure a license to continue exploiting
the work, the loss that will result is not total and thus not
compensable. 132
monly recognized aspect of public domain is that it represents body of works that public is
free to use).
127 Cf Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 111, at 152. The Justice Depart-
ment suggests that the reliance party may have captured the work by treating the work as
its own or by acquiring a substantial number of copies of the work or by an otherwise large
investment in its use. Id. The Justice Department goes on to assume that reliance parties
have at least some vested rights in those copies or editions of the work that they have
accumulated to its date of restoration. Id. The Justice Department concluded that it is
impossible for a reliance party to have a vested interest in the work itself. Id.
128 See id. at 150.
129 See id. at 152-53.
130 Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 643 (1993) (discussing this and other settled principles of Takings
Clause jurisprudence).
131 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (holding
that New York landmark protection law that prohibited owners of Grand central station
from developing airspace above building, did not deprive them of all economic use of prop-
erty because in its present status building was still useful and capable of deriving future
profits for plaintiffs, thus denial by state did not constitute "total" taking); see also Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992) (holding that taking occurs
when real property owner has lost all economically beneficial use of property as result of
government action).
132 See §104A(d(2)(A)(ii)(I). A reliance party has twelve months from the date of publica-
tion of notice in the Federal Register in which to continue to sell off his remaining stock.
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In the Supreme Court's precedent on the takings issue, if some-
thing of value was left in the plaintiffs hands after the effective
regulation took place, no matter how minimal the value might
have been, then no taking has occurred.13 In contrast, although
§ 104A allows a reliance party up to one year in which to sell off
stock, or to procure a license, at the end of the twelve-month pe-
riod the reliance party no longer has a product of its own to sell.
Conceptually, the taking occurs not at the time the copyright was
restored, but at the time the remaining stock is sold off (if that is
in fact possible), and the business is gone.1 3 4 Even if a license is
obtained, the reliance party ceases entirely in its previous busi-
ness of exploiting public domain works, and becomes the agent of
the new copyright holder in distribution efforts.'3 5
B. The Effect of the Connolly Test
In recent takings jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has failed
to establish a concrete rule to determine when a government unit
has effected a taking. 136 An ad-hoc analysis has evolved employing
Id.; see also § 104A (d)(2)(A)(iiXIII), (BXiiXIII). Once notice of intent to enforce has been
published or served directly on a reliance party, he can no longer continue to produce new
copies or phonorecords after that date. Id. It is submitted that a reliance party can seek a
license from the restored copyright's owner, but that depends on the parties reaching a
satisfactory agreement.
133 See, e.g., Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., 508 U.S. at 645 (holding that state imposi-
tion of penalties for employer's withdrawal from multi employer benefit program did de-
prive employers money payable in fines but did not result in unconstitutional taking).
134 Cf Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 183, (testimony of Eugene Volokh). Volokh chal-
lenges the logic of the non-divisibility argument. Id. He states that if the government must
compensate a citizen if it appropriates his property for one year and then returns it, it must
also compensate him if it takes his property in entirety a year from now. Id.135 See Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 111, at 159 n.10. In discussing
§ 104A's phase in provisions, a comparison was made of the phase in provisions to amorti-
zation periods provided in regulations on billboards. Id. The Justice Department noted,
"[tihese phase in provisions have constitutional relevance because they bear on economic
impact of [§ 104A] on the reliance party's property taken as a whole. Id.; see also, Georgia
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 690 F. Supp. 452, 456, 458 (W.D.N.C.
1988). Amortization periods allow a business sufficient time to get some value out of a
particular investment and this will bear on whether a total taking has occurred. Id. It is
submitted, however, that the business of exploiting intellectual property is not the bill-
board business. Billboards sell space, and can be moved to a non-regulated area. The value
of a business that exploits literary works is dependant on the uniqueness of the work. A
company that produces copies of a literary work can no longer do so if someone else holds
the copyright unless they become the agent of the new copyright holder. Cf Joint Hearings,
supra note 2, at 184 (testimony of Eugene Volokh). Section 104A would place all bargaining
power for a license in the hands of the restored copyright owner. Id. There would be noth-
ing for a reliance party to do but accept the copyright owners terms. Id.136 See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986) (noting that
Court has avoided development of rigid formula for identifying 'taking' forbidden by Tak-
ings Clause).
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three factors that will aid a reviewing court in the resolution of a
takings case. 137 In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,'138
the Court enunciated those factors as: (1) the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regula-
tion has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;
and, (3) the character of the governmental action. 139 The following
discussion will consider each factor as it relates to § 104A.
1. Economic Impact of Section 104A on Reliance Parties
The economic impact on an individual reliance party will be im-
possible to predict before an actual claim is presented for consider-
ation.140 For the same reasons interposed above in discussing the
principle of non-divisibility, however, it is not such a sure conclu-
sion that there never will be a situation in which a reliance party
would in fact suffer a complete loss of the property in question,
thus bringing it within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause. 141
Additionally, the Justice Department cites the general tendency
of courts not to grant injunctions, in order to prevent great injus-
tice and public injury, as potentially mitigating the loss that a re-
liance party would sustain.1 42 It is submitted, however, that it is
for precisely those reasons why the economic impact on a reliance
party could be considered complete.
In Stewart v. Abend, 143 the Supreme Court affirmed a Ninth
Circuit decision which held that Jimmy Stewart's use of "It had to
be Murder," the underlying story of the movie "Rear Window," in-
fringed the copyright on the underlying story, when he continued
to use the derivative movie beyond the date on which his license to
137 Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005
(1984) (applying takings factors to claim that trade secrets were misappropriated by gov-
ernment); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980) (supplying analy-
sis of case law created factors used to determine severity of taking by government); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (applying traditional fac-
tors to takings claim brought by developer against New York City).
138 475 U.S. at 211.
139 Id. at 224.
140 See Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 111, at 158 (stating that economic
impact of § 104A ultimately be determined when individual claims are presented and pre-
dicting that there are no likely scenarios where reliance parties will suffer total loss).
141 See id.
142 See id. at 158.
143 495 U.S. 207 (1990), affg Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988).
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do so had lapsed. 144 Despite its holding of copyright infringement,
the Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin Stewart's use of the story.1 45
The work was apparently considered unique and therefore could
not be replaced. 146
Similarly, if a reliance party is making a business exploiting a
particular work, and the new copyright owner can enjoin its use,
not only will the public be deprived of its use, 14 but the reliance
party will be deprived of its business. Nevertheless, it is conceded
that this argument is more theoretical than practical because the
potential for a reliance party to receive absolutely no economic
benefit from its investment is likely to happen in few, if any,
cases. 148
There is some hope for the reliance party, however, because the
Supreme Court has alluded that in cases where a regulation on
land use has taken virtually all economically viable use out of the
property, without taking the property in total, this too can consti-
tute a taking. 149 The Court has expressed some trepidation at the
potentially unclear precedential effect of language used in recent
takings decisions. 1 50  The Court has left an open hypothetical:
where a developer's tract has been required to remain ninety per-
cent in its natural state, would its owner be deprived of all eco-
144 Id. at 1467. The facts of the case indicate that the continued use might not have been
willful at first. Id. In fact, it seems that the owner of the copyright on the underlying work
had died, and the rights had passed from his estate to Chase Manhattan Bank for the
benefit of Columbia University. Id. Like the user of a work in the public domain, Stewart
could easily have thought that he was not infringing on anyone's copyright by using the
work. See id. In addition, no one filed suit to assert copyrights until 1971. Id. That claim
was settled, and the copyright proprietor again sued in the 1980's under a similar cause of
action. Id.
145 Abend, 863 F.2d at 1478-79 (noting that special circumstances existed in facts of case
and further noting that defendants invested significant money, time and effort in creating
derivative movie "Rear Window").
146 See id. at 1479 (noting that injunction could cause public injury by denying public
opportunity to view classic film for many years to come).
147 Cf id.
148 Accord Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 180 (testimony of Eugene Volokh) (noting
that reliance parties would probably use year after restoration to sell their stocks in bulk to
bookstores, and noting further that copies would not be worth as much as before restora-
tion, because pressure of one-year deadline might force distributors to sell them for less,
but would still be worth something).
149 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2902 (1992) (holding that
state must identify background principles of nuisance to justify taking even part of plain-
tiffs property without compensation).
150 See id. at 2894 n.7 (posing hypothetical fact scenarios where application of totality
rule may prove to be unclear).
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nomic value of the land or has he suffered only a non-compensable
diminution in value to it?' 51
When the Court muses this way, it calls into question whether a
complete taking is always absolutely necessary. In fact in two
cases also involving real property, it appears that the Court may
have softened its stance somewhat on the "all or nothing" rule. 152
It is not yet clear whether this doctrinal will be limited to real
property cases. 153 In subsequent cases, the Court has returned to
the rule that mere diminution of value does not effect a taking,
thus lending credence to an assertion that the above exception
may apply only to real property cases.'- 4
Justice Cardozo once remarked that "[tihe law is not indifferent
to considerations of degree." 155 In contrast, it appears that current
the Supreme Court takings jurisprudence requires one to suffer a
total loss due to a government regulation, before compensation is
due.
151 Id.
152 See Dolan v. Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994). The Court held that when a plain-
tiff had to deed over only part of its land to state in return for permit, there was taking and
it was the state's burden to show a "essential nexus" between the regulation and particular
nuisance it was trying to prevent. Id.; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825,
840-43 (1987). The Court held that Coastal Commission effected a taking when it required
plaintiff to maintain access way to beach across his property when the government did not
assert a plausible reason why the boardwalk was essential. Id.; see also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2895 n.8. The Lucas majority recognized dissenting criticism of the total deprivation of all
economic benefit test. Id. The Court admitted that in some cases the landowner with 95%
loss will recover nothing in takings analysis, while the landowner with a total loss will
recover in full. Id. The Court acknowledged that "takings law is full of these all or nothing
situations." Id.
153 See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. In Lucas, the Court was discussing the degree of expec-
tation that citizens have with regard to government regulation. Id. The Court noted that
due to the government's high degree of control over commercial dealings, especially in the
context of the purchase and sale of personal property, citizens should be aware that regula-
tion may render that property worthless. Id.; see also Justice Department Memorandum,
supra note 111, at 161. The Justice Department concluded that a total taking of personal
property would not be treated by the Court as a per se taking. Id. The Justice Department
pointed to the majority opinion in Lucas's distinction between personal and real property
as support for this proposition. Id.
154 See Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for
S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 643 (1993) (holding that mere diminution in value does not constitute
taking); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 222-26 (1986) (same); see
also Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 111, at 161 (noting that Court has re-
turned to its former position that mere diminution in value does not constitute taking).
Contra Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 182 (testimony of Eugene Volokh) (arguing that
there is "nothing magical" about real property as compared to personalty and that copy-
rights should be treated same as real property in Takings Clause analysis).
155 A.LA. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United Sates, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).
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2. Section 104A's Interference With Investment Backed
Expectations
The Justice Department has expressed an opinion that invest-
ments made in reliance that Congress would never restore copy-
rights from the public domain are misguided and unjustified. 156 In
support, it cites a 1967 article written by Professor Melville Nim-
mer which notes, inter alia, that the retroactive protection of
works that would result from accession to the Berne Convention
would be of the greatest import to American authors abroad. 157 In
addition, the Justice Department has cited the House Report to
accompany the Berne Convention Implementation Act which
notes, in substance, that the question of retroactivity will be de-
cided another day, if it is necessary at all.' 58 Accordingly, the
opinion effectively alleges that reliance parties should have fore-
seen the enactment of § 104A.
Undeniably, the article written by the late Professor Nimmer is
evidence that the idea of restoring works has occurred to some of
the great minds in copyright law as far back as 1967.159 David
Nimmer, son of Professor Nimmer and an authority on copyright
law in his own right, has stated, however, that "[an amendment
156 See Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 111, at 158 (applying second prong
of ad hoc takings test and concluding that reliance parties should have had no investment-
backed expectations).
157 See Melville B. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Con-
vention and the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REv. 499, 527 (1967). Professor
Nimmer discussed the retroactivity of Article 18(1) in this 1967 article years before the
United States joined the Berne Convention. Id. In his article Nimmer suggested that Arti-
cle 18 may require retroactive copyright restoration. Id. Nimmer also discusses, however,
an upcoming bill of Congress that would amend the copyright laws and suggested that it
was already in conformity with the spirit, if not the letter of Article 18(1). Id. He remarked
that "[tihis would mean that any reasonable exclusion from the principal of retroactivity
will be permitted so long as the general principle is recognized." Id. Professor Nimmer went
on to say that the construction of Article 18 that was popular in the day was loose and
noted that many Berne members of the day restricted the retroactive effect of their copy-
right laws. Id. Indeed, Nimmer noted that as a last resort Article 18(3) may permit the
construction of Article 18(1) to be limited to protect the interests of those "who have in-
vested money or otherwise changed their positions in reliance on the supposed public do-
main status of certain works." Id. at 529.
158 See H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 6, at 51 (noting that concerns of constitutional
dimension caused Congress not to restore any copyrights in Berne Convention Implimenta-
tion Act).
159 See M. Nimmer, supra note 157, at 529; see also Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 176
(testimony of Eugene Volokh) (stating that provisions of GAIT and Berne Convention
which require restoration of copyrights are generally quite fair, despite dubious constitu-
tionality on Takings Clause grounds); id. at 191 (testimony of Professor Shira Perlmutter)
(supporting policy and principles behind restoration as implementation of general princi-
ples of fairness).
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as radical as copyright resurrection is bound to upset both long-
standing expectations and existing business arrangements."
160
Current developments in the law should put all interested par-
ties on notice that their property may be in jeopardy and they
should react accordingly. 161 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
noted that when doing business in a regulated field, one should
not be surprised when those regulations are amended to further
the goals of the legislation.
162
The copyright laws are the effective regulation in the field in
question. It is perhaps stretching it too far, however, to hold a
reliance party to notice of what is not law, and what expressly was
not made law in the Berne Convention Implementation Act.'
61 It
is submitted that works in the public domain are unregulated and
free for all to use; that is, after all, the point of having the public
domain in the first place.
3. The Character of § 104A
The operation of § 104A does not effect a physical appropriation
of the reliance party's property.16 4 Rather, it adjusts the right of
the American public at-large to use certain works of intellectual
property, to an individual foreign copyright holder.165 Other acts
that have made adjustments in economic benefits from one group
to another have not been considered takings if they are done for
160 D. Nimmer, Second Wind, supra note 6, at 31 (discussing provision within § 104A
that provides protection against liability for those whose business arrangements have in-
cluded warranties against possibility that client's use of public domain work would infringe
on copyright in United States); see also David Nimmer, Impossible Realities, in NIVAER ON
COPYRIGHT § D.01 (Special Supp. 1995) (discussing restoration of foreign copyrights "[in
the realm of paradox").
161 Cf Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226 (1986) (citing Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1984)) (holding that
"[pirudent employers then had more than sufficient notice not only that pension plans were
currently regulated, but also that withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial
obligations").
162 Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227 (quoting FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91
(1958)).
163 See H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 6, at 51 (noting that question of restoring copyright
from public domain may raise issues of constitutional dimension and because of potential
stifling effect on public domain, no copyrights were restored at that time).
164 Cf Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225 (noting that Act there in question "does not physically
invade or permanently appropriate any of the [plaintiffs] assets for its own use").
165 See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225. The Supreme Court has held that if public program
shifts the benefits and burdens of economic life for a public purpose, such program does not
constitute a taking requiring government compensation. Id.
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the greater good of the public. 168 The first question is how a regu-
lation that bestows greater, if not complete, benefits on foreign cit-
izens rather than on American reliance parties, benefits the pub-
lic. The immediate, but incomplete, answer is that it does not.
As discussed above, the Justice Department, as well as other
commentators on the operation of § 104A, cite the overall purpose
of the legislation as a compelling, overriding justification for the
short-term disadvantages some reliance parties will face. Indeed,
the Motion Picture Association of America, the Recording Indus-
try Association of America, and the International Intellectual
Property Alliance, organizations likely to encompass most reliance
parties within their memberships, have supported of retroactive
copyright restoration. 167
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has concluded that if a federal statute
has been enacted to pursue goals that are important to foreign
policy, the government is given the benefit of lower standards of
scrutiny in order that the nation may meet its foreign policy objec-
tives. Congress' stated objectives in enacting § 104A were to com-
ply with the GATT, and at long last to satisfy our obligations
under the Berne Convention on Copyrights. A challenger to this
measure on constitutional grounds will indeed have an uphill
battle.
A successful challenge to § 104A on Equal Protection or Due
Process grounds will depend on the challenger successfully per-
suading a federal district court that the privilege of having a fed-
eral copyright is a fundamental constitutional right. Alternately,
the challenger would have to show that by virtue of his citizen-
ship, he is a member of some protected class.
A federal copyright is in many ways merely a device by which
the government allows an individual to profit from his intellectual
166 See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986) (noting that
withdrawal liability for employers that discontinue pension plans is not compensable in
takings analysis because it serves important public purpose).
167 See Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 255 (statement of Jack Valenti, President and
C.E.O., Motion Picture Assoc. of America) (urging Congress to enact retroactive foreign
copyright restoration for sake of American business abroad); id. at 250 (comments of Jason
Berman, C.E.O. of Recording Industry Assoc. of America) (same); id. at 244 (summary
statement of Eric H. Smith, Executive Director, International Intellectual Property Alli-
ance) (same).
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property works. Economic rights have generally not been consid-
ered fundamental. Simply because the Copyright Clause is found
in the text of the Constitution, it is no guarantee that a copyright
will be deemed a fundamental right.
Although § 104A's restoration of copyrights to foreign citizens,
and its complete ignorance of Americans similarly situated, cries
out for judicial review, ironically, it is difficult to consider an
American citizen, merely because he is an American citizen, a
member of any constitutionally protected class. The Supreme
Court has protected American citizens from being deprived of
their property without due process of law; to hold a statute uncon-
stitutional, however, merely because it bestows greater benefits
on foreign citizens than it does on Americans, is an unlikely
result.
A challenge to § 104A under the Takings Clause will likely fail
on two grounds. First, an individual's non-exclusive use of a pub-
lic domain work can hardly be characterized as private property
meriting Takings Clause compensation. A reliance party may
have captured the public domain work by their investment in its
exploitation. This quasi-property right that a reliance party may
have, however, will likely extend only to those copies or pho-
norecords of the work that they possess at the time the copyright
in them was restored. It is with regard to that tenuous property
right that the second ground to the demise of a takings challenge
becomes relevant.
Section 104A allows reliance parties a full year in which to sell
off their remaining stock of copies or phonorecords. Accordingly,
§ 104A will almost never effectively deprive a reliance party from
recouping every dollar of its investment in the exploitation of pre-
viously public domain works, even if it must eventually forfeit its
entire exploitation business. The Supreme Court precedent on the
Takings Clause has almost invariably required the challenger to
suffer a total loss before compensation by the government is due.
Section 104A is likely to withstand a challenge to its constitu-
tionality. It remains to be seen whether the expectation of bene-
fits in increased reciprocal rights for American intellectual prop-
erty industries will come to pass and justify the short-term costs
to some American reliance parties. Unfortunately for reliance
parties and Americans whose copyrights would be restored if Con-
gress had decided to place them on even ground with their foreign
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counterparts, the prospects that the legislature will reverse this
disparate result, or grant equivalent rights to Americans, are not
on the horizon.
Thomas Gordon Kennedy

